

WILL DETERRENCE "JUST FADE AWAY"?

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*(Deterrence is a threat on capability
(I can't even act and the
moral aspect of this is not to be
discussed)*

Is the world doomed to depend forever on mutual assured destruction, or mutual deterrence, as the structure maintaining peace? Must such an arrangement of five or more mutually threatening nuclear forces produce a nuclear war sooner or later, as accidents are bound to happen or crises are bound to get out of control? If five nuclear powers could be stabilized, do their nuclear arsenals inevitably bait other nations into becoming sixth, seventh, and "nth" nuclear weapons states, in a process of proliferation which would ultimately produce the cataclysms sketched out above? Few Americans realize how blatantly immoral the policy of deterrence is. If the Soviet leadership were to attack American cities with nuclear-warhead missiles, the United States in retaliation would seek to kill a large number of Russians in the cities of the USSR, Russians who probably were opposed to any such launching of World War III, Russians who probably would not even have voted for the Soviet leadership if a free election had ever offered them an alternative. Should we therefore pursue some conscious and deliberate policy of finding an alternative to nuclear deterrence, perhaps involving total disarmament, or instead a conventional rearmament to provide defenses for all concerned as a substitute for retaliatory threats?

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We are well acquainted with the problems of any move toward total disarmament as long as even a small amount of political conflict and distrust remains in the system. The size of the nuclear

arsenals already accumulated, and the relative ease with which one can today produce new nuclear warheads, makes any verified and reliable General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) seem close to impossible. We also have become aware of the costs of any conventional rearmament intended to replace nuclear deterrence, costs in man-years of the military draft, costs in economic resources consumed in the production of tanks and ships, etc., costs perhaps in the increased risks of war as conventional forces confront each other.

Is this
valid
today?

The Role of Popular Expectations

Is there no other alternative, then, to the existing balance of terror? This paper will argue that an alternative does exist, in that mutual deterrence may simply fade away as the risks of war based on political conflict fade. It will be further argued that much of the threat of war since 1945 has been idiosyncratic, based on peculiar circumstances which might now be counted upon to disappear. Peace will break out, not very much because of any genius on our part in avoiding past mistakes, but because nature will no longer be so unkind as to plunge the major powers into situations where they must continually distrust each other, and prepare to wage or threaten nuclear war.

But how can deterrence disappear if the missile forces are not disarmed, if there is no agreement on international inspection to assure that they are disarmed? We all take it for granted that any missiles or bombers in place must be aimed at someone, even

when the latest missiles are easily retargetable just as the manned bombers always were. Yet there is no reason to concede that this must always remain part of the world's political common sense. What if Russian and Chinese and American and British and French missile forces remain in their siloes and the world stops speculating on whom they are aimed at, or better yet, forgets whom they were ever aimed at?

As a model of how this can happen, one could merely cite the example of the short-lived French "all-azimuth" strategy; taken literally, this stated that the French nuclear bomber and missile force was intended to deter nuclear attacks from any other nuclear power, not just from the USSR, and that French missiles might thus be pretargeted against New York and London, as well as against Moscow and Peking. After a very short time, French strategic pronouncements reverted away from this formulation, and (one assumes) any French missile aimed at New York was reprogrammed away. We have never expected British bombers or missiles to be aimed at American cities, even though they are surely capable of hitting these cities. If the detente with China goes even a little further, we will probably terminate all speculation about Chinese nuclear weapons aimed at San Francisco or Seattle or New York, as the focus becomes targets in the Soviet Union. All this may prove is that one can write off or forget the counter-city menace of a foreign nuclear force, even while that force is growing in destructive potential. Not every city in the world has lived in the shadow

of nuclear destruction; even at the height of Cold War tensions, one might have discounted nuclear threats against the city of Berlin, or Hong Kong, and probably Johannesburg, and probably also Addis Ababa. What is projected here is that such exemptions from apprehension about nuclear targeting may spread.

This leads to what may be the core of this optimism, the state of general public expectations about nuclear war, or even of broad elite expectations, as opposed to the fears of those of us who watch military deployments and strategy more closely. It may shock and surprise us as arms controllers to discover how little our fellow citizens think about deterrence and reciprocal threats of assured destruction. Some psychologists might charge this off to escapism and repression of an unpleasant reality. Yet it might rather show that for much of the public that matters deterrence has already begun to wither away. Do most Americans note daily or yearly that their cities are earmarked for destruction by some Soviet missile? Indeed it seems that they do not. The number of journal articles and popular magazine articles on nuclear warfare has neared an all-time low for the post World War II period. The number of Soviet or American statements threatening or alluding to such destruction is also down.

A certain sensitivity may remain on any deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba, or on board Soviet submarines which might dock in Cuba. Yet any such sensitivity might simply illustrate how easily the American public has forgotten its vulnerability to Soviet

ICBM's. Why be concerned about a Russian IRBM which could hit Nashville from Cuba, when a Soviet ICBM could destroy the same city from Russia itself? "A missile is a missile," in Secretary McNamara's words during the Cuban missile crisis, by a logic which the rest of the Kennedy Administration and the rest of the country did not seem to buy. Yet the aroused reaction to Soviet forward deployments may make sense precisely in the terms spelled out above. To move the missiles forward was to earmark American cities for destruction in the public mind. In the public mind, ICBM's in Siberia could be aimed at anyone, and might thus be aimed at no one.

In retrospect, one might therefore take more seriously various Soviet proposals that Polaris submarines not be deployed forward within firing range of their targets, and even that each side harness its "war propaganda." The form^{er} has always seemed a plot to hobble an important part of the U.S. deterrent force, and the latter is incompatible with a free press. Yet elementary fairness might ask us to inquire why Americans have become so upset about Soviet submarine-based missiles deployed into the Caribbean, if Russians are to react calmly to American missiles of the same type in the Norwegian Sea. Perhaps the symbolic aspects of nuclear deployments have indeed amounted to a very powerful and bothersome form of war propaganda, at least in an earlier day before the world's sensitivity to such weapons had eased. The Russian proposals here may have been neither naive nor disingenuous, but

rather reactions to serious signals of hostility, at least as preceived by the publics that matter.

Some might question a theory of world peace of super-power arms control based on as seemingly fragile a reed as mass opinion. Yet such opinion may over a decade accomplish more than we have expected, in easing political problems that otherwise would have caused trouble, in altering deployment and targeting policies of which we disapprove. Perhaps what we are heading toward could be compared with the "confrontation" of the Austrian and Swiss tank forces of today. Each is still taught to see itself as a group of mechanized professional killers; each sits poised within striking distance of the other. Yet one almost has to go back to the days of William Tell to find any serious speculation by which Austrians will be mowed down by the fire from the latest model Swiss tanks, or vice versa. Would that we could separate out assured destruction from assured destruction potential in the missile field as well.

Does deterrence frighten the world, as Fred Ikle and Bruce Russett have suggested, appalling our publics by the very immorality of the strategic attack plans, and by the jeopardy into which all cities are placed? This analysis suggests that it does not. Will any reduction in deterrence be frightening, for West Germans or Japanese, or for others who may not feel as covered by someone's nuclear umbrella as in the past? Again, it will be argued that we overrate public feelings here; European scholars of military

strategy can explicate such concerns to us in a language we understand, but it may be a language as irrelevant to the German public as to the American.

Does the discussion of deterrence and nuclear weapons questions perhaps bore the world, instead of frightening it? The answer propounded here is yes. Deterrence has become boring, perhaps happily so, if we want a new kind of peace by 1980, but also precariously so, because the world that arms controllers care about may face some new pitfalls. Deterrence has become boring because only some very special circumstances ever made it engrossing for the general public or even most of the relevant political elites. A digression on what these peculiar circumstances have been may thus now be in order.

The contention here will be that there must be a risk of "conventional war" before deterrence and mutual assured destruction become relevant to most people on this globe. Because there has not been any such risk of war between the U.S. and Britain since 1945, we have never menaced each other with "mutually assured destruction," even though SAC could have found London its easiest target ever, since moving to bases in Britain in 1948.

The Strategic Weapons Irritant

Missile or bomber confrontations of course can be a cause of war all by themselves, as the advantages of striking first stampede someone into trying a preemptive war, or adopting a policy of

"shoot on warning." There have been points in history where bomber vs. bomber or soft-missile vs. soft-missile confrontations might have posed such a threat, and it could, of course, appear again if greatly improved accuracies in missile guidance were to be accompanied by enormous breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare techniques. There may even have been times where the risk of preemptive war percolated through to reach the public that we have been discussing, making them war-fearful and deterrence-minded. In the 1950's, a TV program on the strategic balance would have run film clips of SAC bomber crews racing to their planes, conveying a sense of great urgency lest an enemy strike catch them on the ground; today's program (unless the producer is so out-of-touch or lazy as to use old film) would rather show bored missile firers sitting securely in their bunkers, waiting, without any urgency. It would be a fascinating exercise to test the impact of these changed images on the public's concern about nuclear war. We do know that the public's concern is down.

The change from bombers to missiles was, of course, part of a series of major technological innovations that also gripped more public attention simply because of the novelty of it all. A-bombs were new in 1945, and H-bombs in 1952. Who would get the H-bomb first was an important and gripping question, even for the layman.

Who similarly would get jet bombers first? And who would get missiles, or submarines on which missiles could be based? The question of who would orbit a satellite first in space surely captured the American public's attention; when the Russians did it first, it seemed to suggest a

military capability that they would hold as a monopoly for a time, and might not such a monopoly produce war? Similar attention focused on the first men in space, and then the first men on the surface of the moon.

Yet as the inattention to recent space flights (and recent Soviet missile procurements) has shown, the novelty has worn off. No one will again be as much "ahead" in a novel field of endeavor as the Russians seemed with Sputnik, or perhaps the Americans with the first moon landing. Technological novelty captures attention even while it threatens instabilities which could produce a preventative or preemptive war. But again, happily, the novelty may have worn off.

We speculate on the Soviet investment in missiles and guess that they might be trying to capture the aura of superiority for themselves that Kennedy had with his "missile gap in reverse" in 1962. Perhaps the Russians will achieve this goal, as the world is awed by the "new Russian superiority" in missiles. Yet perhaps the boredom syndrome we have been sketching out will cheat the Russian leaders here, as the editorial writers of Brussels and Singapore simply lose count of who's ahead, because they have lost interest.

Arms control theory has, of course, made a major contribution here, in spelling out an understanding of what kinds of weapons make war more likely even without any change in political conflict,

and what kinds make war less likely. A cruel nature may yet curse us with technological opportunities that favor the offensive and the first-strike. Mindless pursuit of scientific research "for its own sake" could also generate such destabilizing weapons. Yet for the moment all of such destabilizing offensive weapons developments seem unlikely. *(There is a growing need for world security as is explained in the introduction to the B.M. report)*

(Is this present or future?) The "arms race" in strategic weapons can make us all war-minded in another way, of course. Any large expenditures on weapons are likely to reflect insultingly on whoever the weapons are directed against. It is difficult to buy an "anti-Russian" or "anti-Chinese" offensive or defensive missile system without suggesting to Congress and the public that these foreign states are hostile and not to be trusted. *after the war*

As the novelty of weapons expenditures has worn off, however, the need to indict any particular foreign country as a villain has also diminished. Americans seem willing to spend billions on defense today (albeit fewer billions than in the past) without working themselves into any particular paroxysms of rage against Moscow or Peking or any other state in particular. Observers who favor disarmament may lament the fact that Americans will regard it as so natural to spend huge sums on weapons; yet this very "naturalness" reduces the arms race as any real war signal. Americans buying weapons which cost billions of dollars do not really expect that they will ever be used. Perhaps we should be very pleased with this.

We condemn the guile of a President Nixon when it is applied in ways we disapprove. But that guile has apparently allowed him to achieve a sense of detente with the Soviet Union, and with Communist China, even while large portions of the arms race continue. I submit that we would not prefer a more honest and candid approach if it involved reminding us again and again about whom all these multiple-warhead missiles are to be aimed at.

The Berlin Irritant

It may thus require a risk of war somewhere on this globe to activate any general interest in deterrence, any craving for it, or any revulsion with it. As just mentioned, the bombers and missiles necessary for mutual assured destruction can themselves suggest the risk of war, but they are not doing so in the 1970's. What else can make us expect war? Has "conventional war" or "limited war" indeed been the normal pattern for the world since 1945, or has it also been exceptional? How much real risk of war is there? Is the risk of war perhaps now declining, as various special causes for war are at last eroding?

The uses of recent history for the projection of policy can produce some fascinating debates, in part because persons who had policy responsibility in the 1950's or 1960's feel pressed to justify their earlier stands as they comment on policy in the 1970's. Has any and all war or war-preparedness been foolish and mistaken, including all of what we classify as Cold War mentality? Or has

it been well-founded, as "limited wars" will continue as the natural outlet for the political hostility between Marxist states and non-Marxist, since it is only nuclear war that has become unthinkable; while this latter view makes all of the policy of the 1950's and 1960's seem a little more rational, it suggests very pessimistic predictions for the decade ahead.

A third view will be exemplified here, that hostility and military preparation and concern with deterrence made sense for good reasons for the first twenty-five years after World War II, but that changes in the structures of conflict will alleviate such problems now, in a way that does not reflect particularly badly or well on the judgments of any policy-makers.

Is there a significant risk of war in Europe in the 1970's? Most probably not. Perhaps Stalin or his successors were longing to conquer Paris, so that the confrontation of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces evolved as the natural consequence of such designs. Yet it will be argued here that most of European Cold War tension of the 1950's and 1960's should be traced instead to the **b**izarre situation of West Berlin, a "bone in the throat" of the Communist leadership, but an area dear also to the United States and its allies. For a long time it seemed that the existence of West Berlin was to be a threat to the stability and survivability of the Communist East German regime, while its surrender might cast an impossibly damaging doubt on western resolve. The wall in 1961

may well have solved the problem, even though it would take some months and years to tell for certain; the wall gave East Germany control over its own population, without menacing Western sovereignty over West Berlin. If there were other reasons for East Germany to lust for control over all of Berlin (perhaps just to remove an ugly blot from its map) these were more minor than the escape of young East Germans before the wall; the change in the demographic makeup of West Berlin since 1961 moreover makes the enclave much less than an economic asset to be lusted after, an enclave of pensioners heavily subsidized by Bonn.

But for West Berlin, the division of Germany and Europe might have become stable long ago, with substantial garrisons on each side to assure this, but with few serious scenarios for war. Only the threat of a blockade against West Berlin, and the need for a counter-threat of a military push down the Autobahn really have justified investments in tanks for NATO, instead of minefields. Relations between the two Germanies will still face periodic obstacles and pitfalls, but the diminished significance of West Berlin as a menace or asset on either side will reduce speculation about war.

The Western counter-threat to a Berlin blockade has indeed already for some time been non-military, namely a counter-embargo on industrial shipments to East Germany and Eastern Europe. Given that the Communist economies despite their best efforts each year

become more dependent on western technological inputs, this has become a far more potent deterrent to interference with Berlin than either a NATO tank column or the risk of escalation to World War III would be. In a sense, an attack on West Berlin today is deterred in the same way as an attack on Hong Kong, by arrangements whereby the Communist attacker would lose more than he would gain simply in terms of economics.

The Berlin issue has been the essential ingredient for war scenarios all along the European front. There is no serious war threat where the Warsaw Pact and NATO meet in northern Norway or eastern Turkey, or on the borders of Bulgaria with Greece and Turkey. We can come back to speculating about the future of Yugoslavia after the death of President Tito, but apart from this, what is there to promise war between the two blocs?

The Guerrilla War Irritant

Turning away from Europe and Berlin, a second important idiosyncrasy of the 1960's is embodied in the final stages of the decolonization process in Asia and Africa, as the Communist powers and the West became engaged in a test of resolve and method on guerrilla war. In the mid-1950's few could have known for certain whether the guerrilla techniques of "wars of national liberation" or later "people's war" could be applied successfully from country to country, or whether they might again and again be rebuffed by techniques of "counterinsurgency." While the Soviet

Union seemed to be supportive of "wars of national liberation" for a time, the lead in espousing and theorizing about such wars soon went to Peking and the writings of Chairman Mao. On the American side, similar abstractions might be found in the writings of Walt Rostow.

The shift in focus on war-scenario is strikingly illustrated by the changes in duty for the Special Forces "Green Berets." These forces were originally intended to be dropped into Eastern Europe, or left behind in West Germany, to harass the rear areas of the Red Army in a conventional war being fought in Europe perhaps as the result of a Berlin crisis. Within a short time, the "Green Berets" and other conventional war options were to be shifted to Vietnam to combat guerrilla warfare rather than to practice it.

Men will disagree for a long time into the future as to what lesson should be learned from Vietnam. It will be argued here that the primary lesson is one again of idiosyncrasy, that Mao and Rostow, as well as Giap and Che Guevara and Maxwell Taylor, were guilty of excessive abstraction. What happened in Vietnam (and can we agree yet on what happened, on "who won"?) proves little or nothing about Malaysia or Venezuela or Chile or Zambia or Mozambique, or Israel or Northern Ireland. Former colonies and other states may thus be muchly influenced by local conditions, some being ripe for a Marxist revolutionary takeover, and others

very impervious to it. As each side feels more secure in the territories it controls, and less tempted to challenge another power's control over other territory, peace becomes more likely, and war becomes less plausible. Guerrilla war may thus be much less likely for the 1970's than it seemed at the start of the 1960's, indeed than it was in the 1960's.

War is likely in any mode of combat when the offensive seems stronger than the defensive; it becomes unlikely when the reverse is true, when the forces who have first established themselves in an area seem to have an advantage over those coming in to try to displace them.

If each side now realizes that victory in guerrilla wars will largely be settled by local conditions, the aftermath of Vietnam might be forecast to induce further waves of detente between the United States and most of the Communist states. The opening of detente between China and the United States reflected this to a large extent even before Vietnam had even come close to peace. New openings between North and South Korea reinforce the pattern. Part of such detentes can be explained by a general weariness on each side with the costs of continued confrontation, as domestic priorities begin to exert themselves everywhere. Part may also be explained by new conflicts between Communist states, to be discussed further below. Yet a large portion may simply reflect the discovery that guerrilla war was peculiarly attached to the decolonization process; as that process draws closer to completion, the

occasions for armed conflict between Communist and non-Communist powers are diminished. Just as a resolution of the Berlin question has extracted a thorn of conflict in Europe, the deemphasis of "people's war" and "counterinsurgency" does so elsewhere.

The trend being sketched out here may seem hopelessly optimistic. Yet who in 1968 would have predicted the Nixon-Kissinger detente with China, or the simultaneous warming of relations with the USSR, or the East German-West German conciliation, or the North Korean-South Korean openings?

Indeed it might seem that the U.S. President has become compulsive about tidying up his relations with every country on the globe. Friendship and normalization of relations is now being offered to Albania, and an anti-highjacking agreement has finally been signed with Cuba. Cuba might seem a fine test case for the hopes of peaceful relations between the blocs in the 1970's. For a long time it displayed, indeed in some ways more than Communist China, an enthusiastic support for guerrilla wars. Such support at times was verbal rather than material, but even the verbal is of great importance in politics, and a hostile U.S. response was entirely predictable. At the extreme, the American hostility produced an invasion attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. At a worse extreme for the chances of peace, Cuba became the focus of confrontation involving the forward deployment of Russian missiles in 1962; perhaps as Khrushchev later claimed, this illustrated Soviet concerns to deter another American invasion attempt; perhaps

it instead reflected the apparent instabilities of the strategic arms race at that stage, as discussed above.

Either way, Cuba is far less likely to become a focus of armed conflict in the 1970's. By opening relations with non-revolutionary regimes in Latin America, Castro has moderated his commitment to confrontation with the U.S. Perhaps it is too much to expect a Nixon visit to Havana, bringing Cuban cigars back with him for the starved consumers of America. Yet a warming of relations here may again be likely, as the irritants fade. Even the issue of Soviet strategic deployments to the Caribbean area may fade over time, as the "strategic significance" really becomes immaterial, as the "political significance" fades when memories of Kennedy's "finest hour" in 1962 fade.

Economics As An Irritant Or A Deterrent?

Perhaps it would be time for a pessimist to intervene at this stage to note that U.S. relations with several other Latin American nations have worsened, even if a slight improvement with Cuba might be detected. Surely Chile and Peru illustrate a contrary trend, as more and more of American business investment abroad is threatened with expropriation. In the old days, the U.S. Marines might have been sent in, or the CIA would have deployed its operatives to engineer an armed coup. As Japanese and other foreign investment becomes similarly vulnerable, won't there be regular recurrences of economically-motivated gunboat diplomacy in Latin America, and

elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, to renew the coming decade's harvest of war?

It is important to remember that we are speculating about the likelihood of war. Conflict may worsen, for economic or political or other reasons, but it may be altogether reasonable to discount any reversion to war as the means to resolving such conflict. The example of Japan is illustrative. Too many of us have been awaiting a Japanese reassertion of national prerogatives, whereby the Japanese Self-Defense Force begins intervening from country to country to protect the already ubiquitous Japanese businessmen. Where could one find a better rationale for the expansion of the naval or ground or air forces of Japan? Yet recent discussions between Japanese Defense Agency spokesmen and Japanese businessmen have gone in very much the opposite direction, warning business that it should expect no military protection whatsoever if threatened with confiscation or worse when abroad. Such businessmen have been told simply to rely on Japan Air Lines to fly them home, with prospects of some financial compensation by the government for their losses. Japanese retaliation against the offending underdeveloped country may thus include the cutting off of aid, but not the deployment of any gunboats or other military forces. Gunboat diplomacy has allegedly been "costed out" as an operations research problem in Japan and has not been found cost-effective.

Indeed, it may well be that the United States is reaching similar conclusions. Discussions between ITT and the CIA on

intervention in Chile seem scandalous enough, but the important point may be that the Nixon administration decided not to adopt the interventions proposed. Economic pressures will be brought to bear to try to protect American investment, but few if any military threats will show up. There is something about the rules of trade in general that will give various sides economic weapons with which to retaliate when an adversary uses similar weapons. "Trade wars" may thus be fought between the U.S. and various under-developed countries, or between the European Community and other states tampering with property. Concurrent "trade wars" may be fought between the U.S. and Japan, or the U.S. and Europe. Yet again it might be highly misleading to expect any of such heightened rivalries to be accompanied by military tensions. In 1937, Japan was excluding Americans from trade with China at the point of a bayonet; today it is by the power of the transistor. When Japan challenges and beats the U.S. by the rules of international trade, analogies with U.S. reactions to the Panay incident may be altogether misleading.

This might lead us into a much longer inquiry into whether increased trade between nations necessarily makes war less likely or not. What about the East European dependence on the free world for technology? What about the Russian and Chinese dependence on the same world for grain and computers? And what about U.S. dependence in the future on Soviet supplies of oil or natural gas?

High levels of trade between countries do not inevitably guarantee an absence of armed conflict. High levels of trade can indeed generate additional disagreements and disputes which might serve as a cause for war. If it is thought (as in 1914) that wars can be fought and won very quickly and painlessly, then economic assets along a border may seem like tempting prizes for victory, even if a steady flow of trade must resume across the borders wherever they are relocated.

Having conceded that much to the risks of war, it is nonetheless probable that increased trade is a deterrent ~~to~~ war, whenever the relationship has become complicated and fragile and valuable enough, so that a great deal would be lost to both sides in a war, a great deal that could not easily be replaced. The dependence of Communist countries on western industrial imports may be weaving a relationship that is much more constraining than the dependence of Britain on German imports in 1914. Knowledge of the economic consequences of a war may thus deter war increasingly much in the future. It may even deter various applications of economic weaponry that in the past would have produced a response to war. Military wars thus would become rarer by this prediction, while even "economic wars" would be fought as "limited wars."

The Japanese government thus at the moment purports to be depending on the attractiveness of trade with Japan, and of Japanese aid grants, as the deterrent to nationalizations of

Japanese investments around the underdeveloped world; whether or not it reverts to gunboats as an additional deterrent remains to be seen, but the intentions for the moment do not go in this direction. To illustrate the effectiveness of economic deterrents all the more clearly, we must revert to the examples of West Berlin and Hong Kong cited earlier. For many years the western dilemma for the defense of Berlin was described as follows: What if the Russians and East Germans simply closed and blockaded the Autobahn, without firing a shot? Would the West be able to escalate to a shooting war, given all the risks of further escalation to World War III? The answer for more recent years has been far more reassuring: The retaliation for the non-violent economic blockade of Berlin is to impose a non-violent economic embargo on West German and other free world shipments to the Communist bloc, imposing damages sufficient to deter. Similarly, it is the economic losses of aggression that deter China from seizing Hong Kong, and not any conventional defense of the colony by British troops, or any threats of nuclear retaliation by the British strategic force.

Before crediting economics with being too effective in deterring wars, however, we should remind ourselves how atypical it is for there to be any war threats at all along the boundaries of the world. There are no such threats at the moment, for example, in Latin America, and very few in Africa. Even the liberal supporter of arms control sometimes betrays ambivalence as a spectator here,

concluding that the Latin American and African armies are not "real armies"; presumably, they are incapable of fighting wars, since they do not fight them. A general boredom sets in on military questions for these regions, at least until some interesting new speculation sets in on a possible future arms race and military confrontation between Argentina and Brazil, or a guerrilla war in Tchad, or the Sudan. Perhaps these are indeed mainly "parade-ground armies," squandering money on uniforms and officer's clubs and unnecessary jet planes. Yet perhaps they really show something we might have forgotten in our concentration on the Cold War and all the limited wars it was allegedly likely to produce; it is much more normal in international relations to arm than to fight.

There is relatively little irredentism left in Latin America; there could be much in Africa, but for the astute decision of most African rulers to suppress such issues among themselves. Perhaps wars do not occur because none of these armies are prepared to fight them. But we may have placed the burden of proof on the wrong side of the war-peace question here. Perhaps wars do not occur because wars are costly and the gains have not seemed comparable to the costs all across this zone.

This is not meant to be an indictment of the reasoning that went into NATO preparations in the 1950's. This author believes that the Cold War may well have been a very necessary confrontation, until each side could get its political defenses into order; large standing armies on each side of the line through Europe may even be

more conducive to peace than substantially reduced forces. War had a distinct likelihood in Europe in the 1950's, because of Berlin, because of the value of Germany to either side, because of the uncertain futures of various countries on either side of the line.

Wars Unrelated to ^{the Cold War} ~~Marxism~~

War was possible in Europe, but it is less likely now. If it was not a mistake to prepare for this risk, it could certainly be a mistake to project it out to many other parts of the globe, or to many future years. War is indeed possible now, but perhaps in fewer places, and different places, from the trouble spots we expect. Where war remains likely, moreover, it may very well be as idiosyncratic as has been contended for the instances mentioned above. Indeed, most of such wars may turn out to be quite unrelated to the Cold War, or to conflicts of ideology, or to any serious global pattern. Perhaps the best analog might be with the Gran Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia from 1932 to 1935, a grizzly enough conflict which ran on substantially unrelated to conflicts anywhere else in the world.

Apart from the Cold War, there have indeed been only two major war threats in the 1960's, each of them involving a Muslim side with irredentist claims against a non-Muslim state. It may seem that the Arab states will never forgive Israel for existing, for having dispossessed Arabs from parts of Palestine in the 1920's, and then from a larger part in 1948 and 1949, and then from a still

larger part in 1967. It also has seemed that Pakistan would never forgive India for having absorbed Kashmir with its Muslim population in 1948. Irredentism has plagued other borders in other times; the notion that justice dictates a movement of the boundary can easily enough motivate a people to want to fight a war, despite its costs. Yet there may indeed be something about Islamic religious belief that peculiarly makes Arabs and Pakistanis unwilling to admit defeat, or to let bygones be bygones; perhaps this religion more than others leads its adherents to expect that justice requires revenge, that "right makes might," so that revenge through military victory will ultimately be given to the just. Mexicans have written off their claims to Texas and California, and Germans seem now to have written off their claims to Pomerania and Silesia. But what can dissuade the Arabs from pursuing their claims, except a military defeat so enormous as to make the prospect of revenge lose all its plausibility? Even the outcome of the 1967 war did not seem to impart this message to the Arab publics that matter. Perhaps the Indian conquest of East Pakistan at last has driven home to the rest of Pakistan the impossibility of liberation of Kashmir, but perhaps not.

Preserving peace in the Middle East may thus seem a never-ending exercise in maintaining a continuing Israeli military superiority to force the Arab governments at least to postpone any moves for revenge. The decisiveness of the Indian victory

in 1972 may have eliminated any Pakistani threats. Yet the South Asian case hardly yet assures peace, for one would have to inquire whether Hindus might now become as aggressive as Muslims have been vengeful. Any classical "balance of power" among the conventional forces of the region has indeed now been upset. There are political factions and parties in India that have openly talked of reuniting all of Pakistan to India, along with Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, etc. The various governments involved have all shown a little nervousness now as to whether the flush of victory may not lead India to take an interest in such expansions.

Prediction is hazardous, and the signs point in differing directions. Jan Sangh, the most openly nationalist of the Indian political parties, was soundly defeated by Mrs. Gandhi in the last elections. India, on the other hand, is moving ever closer to an acquisition of nuclear weapons. Whether an Indian atomic bomb would have a sobering effect or the opposite on expansionist sentiment in New Delhi is not yet obvious. It may turn out that Hindu militance is largely defensive, so that it will abate when the inability of Pakistan to menace Kashmir any longer has become clear. Some years yet may have to elapse before all of such dust has settled. There is thus no gainsaying the fact that wars will continue to be possible along the borders of India, and of Israel. The major point to be made here is that such wars remain atypical and peculiar in their source.

Wars Caused By the USSR?

If India remains imponderable as a launcher of wars, or respecter of frontiers, what of the Soviet Union, the object of all our fears and concerns for containment until recently? ^{Is} the USSR not intent on maintaining a military control over Eastern Europe, such that any real commitment to mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) is ^{oh} unlikely at best? Doesn't the Breznhev Doctrine bode ill for any Communist country that will try to assert its independence of the USSR in the future, while threatening already-independent Yugoslavia and China as well? And what of the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, if we are looking for hope that wars will be rare in the future?

Yet it takes two sides to make a war. The Russian intervention into Czechoslovakia in 1968 was not a war, if only because the Czechs chose not to resist. If it was a war, by the legal standards of international law, it surely was far less bloody and costly than such internal police actions as the Nigerian integration of Biafra (to move way down on the scale, it killed twice as many people as the suppression of the prison insurrection at Attica.) The West in no way intervened to egg the Czechs into making the events of 1968 a war, and did relatively little to intervene in Hungary in 1956, which assuredly was more war-like and bloodier. Such events may reflect badly on Soviet respect for neighbor's intentions, but nonetheless they do not really upset prospects of

peace in Europe and elsewhere. The Russians can be counted upon to intervene violently in such places precisely because the United States and its allies can be counted upon to stay out. When this message becomes clear enough, it may mean that the local population and army can be counted upon in turn not to resist. A police action in Prague may thus provoke little more of international confrontation, or threat of nuclear war, or occasion for tangible deterrence, than a police action in Kiev or in Wounded Knee. China and Yugoslavia (and perhaps Rumania) aside, the Brezhnev Doctrine is not a threat to peace, but a threat to independence from Moscow. When people elect not to fight for their independence, peace occurs by default.

If one is concerned about the extent of self-determination in Prague or Budapest, of course, there will be more than enough cause to be dissatisfied with the international system of the 1970's. One can go further to claim that any pervasive attachment to peace may give too much of the political benefit to those who are most willing to go to war; if American unwillingness to fight wars in defense of Czechoslovakia or other countries in Europe becomes the dominant factor, will most of Europe not become as vulnerable to threats as Finland? The "Finlandization" of West Germany and other states in Western Europe would allegedly emerge if the threat of war was lessened only by American moves to steer clear of conflict, as the Soviet leadership could threaten war

whenever it wants a political concession in Helsinki or in Bonn or elsewhere.

There are several answers to this. First, one might comment that Finland is a very nice place to live, as all kind of counter-leverage can be exercised to deny the Russians anything approaching total control over political life. Sweden does not have to threaten war to keep the Communists from staging a coup in Finland, for the other retaliatory measures Stockholm might take may suffice to deter the Russians here. Perhaps over time the United States may shield Europe in many of the same non-military ways that Sweden shields Finland. Second, the internal capability of the West Germans and West Europeans for resisting the threat of Russian attack may be great enough to make such threats even less potent than in the Finnish case.

Third, it is hardly clear that any substantial American force withdrawal is required to reinsure peace in Europe. Peace can thus be made plausible for most of the sectors facing the Red Army without any of the thinning out that might offer Moscow great political leverage.

A few potential war zones may need some discussion. The fate of Yugoslavia after the death of Marshal Tito causes concern, given the unresolved conflicts between Serbs and Croats in that country, and the temptation such conflicts offer the USSR or other outside forces to intervene. Whether Yugoslavia can remain a militarily

untroubled area may well depend on its retaining that indigenous political strength one finds in Austria and Sweden; otherwise the temptations of political conquest may pull in various forces as part of a mutual preemption. Erasing the earliest example of an openly dissident Communist movement may have an extra appeal for the USSR, since any and all disagreement as to what Communism amounts to lessens the ideological appeal of Marxism around the globe.

Yet if the Yugoslav Army remains united, and adept at defending Yugoslav territory by guerrilla tactics in the mountains, this may still suffice to deter any recourse to armed violence. Unless one is anxious to find a viable scenario for war, the Yugoslav case can hardly be checked off as a sure instance of trouble. Perhaps national traditions or other ethnically-based factors would explain why the USSR did not have to fear guerrilla resistance in Czechoslovakia, but would have to fear it in Yugoslavia. Perhaps the presence or absence of mountainous terrain is more important for explaining differences. One thing is certain: a certain kind of guerrilla capability is conducive to peace. Guerrilla techniques will cause war where bases in country I can easily be used to conduct and foment terrorism and guerrilla operations in country II; this has been the classic nightmare of the "domino theory" fear of indirect aggression by guerrilla tactics. Where guerrilla capabilities instead depend substantially or totally on indigenous

strengths, whether it be the support of the surrounding people, or the first-hand knowledge of surrounding mountains, then such capabilities contribute much more to the defense, and to the discouragement and prevention of war.

In effect the Swiss Army has been training and preparing for guerrilla war for much of the twentieth century, in ways which probably deterred Hitler's attack during World War II. Yet there never has been any prospect of Switzerland exporting guerrilla war or exporting revolution to any of its neighbors. Since the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949, there has similarly been no exportability of Yugoslav guerrilla war potential, nor of the Albanian for that matter. Yet the indigenous capabilities for waging an insurgency which would tax and punish an invading army have been quite real.

It is indeed remarkable that China has so resolutely praised the Albanians all through the 1960's, who never threatened to wage guerrilla war beyond their boundaries, such praise being well ahead of Chinese praise for the North Vietnamese. It is altogether possible that the Chinese have been more sincere than we assumed in asserting that they were endorsing only indigenously-based guerrilla movements. While the writings of Che Guevara and Regis Debray (and at points Giap) suggest a greater willingness to stimulate guerrilla warfare from bases outside the country, by the despatch of agitators and terrorists and "focos" to serve as catalysts for an insurrection, there has been little if any

endorsement of this in the writings of Mao on guerrilla warfare, and the famous Lin Piao "Long Live People's War" statement of 1965 in effect served to criticize such tactics.

An earlier armed conflict might appear in Rumania, another flaw in the Communist unity Moscow would presumably like to re-establish. If the Rumanians are prepared to surrender as easily as the Czechs, of course, this confrontation would again not amount to a threat to peace, but merely to national autonomy. Perhaps the Rumanians will be able to get away without invasion and also without submission, by a combination of harnessing American and West European and Chinese moral support to a modicum of credible military resistance. If the U.S. is prepared to risk that Western Europe will be slightly Finlandized, as part of banishing thoughts and risks of war, perhaps the Russians in reverse can be brought to accept something like Rumanianization.

Indeed, we need more phrases like "Finlandized" and "Rumanianized" in our discussions of military problems. We too often talk of "war" when we really mean "thought of war" or "threat of war," or even "threat of threat of war." The object of the rational chain comes to be used as a verbal shorthand to describe the entire chain, both at the strategic level and the tactical. When Secretary Laird claimed that he feared a Soviet first-strike in 1980, if the U.S. missile posture were not augmented, he may have been exaggerating, but more probably he was abbreviating. A fuller and more honest statement might have cited a concern that by 1980 his

successor would have to worry about the lingering possibility of such a strike, and might then behave differently in a crisis. "World War III" becomes the shorthand expression for "fear of World War III" or "shadow of World War III." Similarly, American troops may not need to remain in West Germany so much to defend Germans against Russian attack, but rather to defend them against having to contemplate the possibility of such an attack, with whatever undesirable political adjustments this would have to entail.

✓ "Finlandization" is a good phrase because it avoids reifying the hypothetical, but focuses (by analogy) on what is already real. The Rumanian example is thrown in here to remind us that this can be a two-way street. When President Nixon visited Bucharest, it was intended to throw a shadow of possible American indignation and possible military reactions over any Russian effort to normalize the position of Rumania within the Warsaw Pact.

Sino-Soviet War?

This brings us at length to the most important example of a Communist state which upsets Moscow by its failure to maintain Marxist solidarity, and thereby produces what might seem a very serious risk of war for the 1970's. Will Russia and China avoid going to war, avoid spoiling a decade of peace? What are we to make of the enormous increase in Soviet troop deployments along the borders with China, deployments which have risen from 15 divisions in 1968 to 49 divisions by 1972, augmented apparently

by tactical nuclear forces? A catalog of possible Russian motives for the arms buildup in the East amounts virtually to the spectrum of all the decision-explanations we have become familiar with, ranging from parochial bureaucratic interests to the national interests involved.

It is entirely possible, of course, that the Russian deployments reflect the needs of the Soviet Army to deploy itself somewhere. If deployments in Europe cause tension, the forces simply had to move elsewhere. Such an interpretation is contradicted slightly by the fact that the Russian troops in Siberia have not by and large been drawn from Poland or East Germany, but have actually been called up from the reserves. If the Soviet Army was expansion-minded, of course, fanning tensions with the Chinese might have seemed the right way to achieve this, cashing in on latent "Yellow Peril" sentiments in the Soviet public at large. The density of the Russian deployment might also be explained by bureaucratic needs in a different way. In the outbreak of fighting around Damanksy Island in the Ussuri River in 1969, the Chinese were charged with having suddenly surprised and out-numbered a Russian garrison, thus artificially winning a victory which surely bruised the professional reputations of the Russian commanders. As a guarantee against any repetition of such humiliations, the Soviet armed forces may have demanded, and gotten, substantial reinforcements along all sectors of the frontier.

A different "defensive" explanation of the Soviet deployments would point to the propaganda regularly broadcast from China to the various Asian ethnic groups in Siberia and central Asia, in effect suggesting that they have been victimized by Great Russian cultural chauvinism. Over time, such broadcasts in the Asian languages might have had some effect in stirring rebellion, and the saturating Soviet ground force deployments might have been intended to head this off.

Again crediting the Russians with being on the defensive, one could point to the peculiar supply and communication lines which shape the Sino-Soviet frontier; the Chinese highways and railway lines approach the frontiers directly, while the Soviet problem is exemplified by the Trans-Siberian railway which runs parallel and close to the frontier, thus vulnerable to being cut by any sudden Chinese probe. Perhaps the Russians in a time of even moderate tension thus need many more troops on their side of the border for a sense of security than the Chinese need on their side.

Yet this may enormously overrate the likelihood of a Chinese military attack on the USSR, or even of Chinese military assistance if some Asian group within the USSR had initiated a rebellion. China has been vocal in its criticisms of the U.S., and of India, and more recently of the USSR, but its history since 1949 has not shown any great penchant for armed operations; both the Korean War and the short war with India can be plausibly seen as Chinese defensive responses to a foreign advance.

It may thus far more plausibly be the Soviet leadership which is seriously contemplating an aggressive war, conventional or nuclear, against China. The trial balloons of preemptive nuclear strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities leaked by Victor Louis in 1969 were surely authorized by the Russian leadership; the USSR, as noted, has augmented its conventional forces along the frontier more than the Chinese. Perhaps such an attack would come only in defense of India, with whom Moscow has signed a mutual defense treaty of sorts; yet the decisive defeat of Pakistan by India in 1971 hardly puts New Delhi in that much jeopardy in face of any joint Chinese-Pakistani attack.

More central to Russian concerns would be Peking's role as an alternative Mecca for the Communist world; as long as the Chinese are outspoken in their criticisms of the USSR, the Communist world will remain in a state of mutual self-contradiction which the outside world can exploit. A Soviet invasion to depose the Maoists might conceivably reunite the bloc and reestablish the kinds of consistency that at times in the past may have made Marxism persuasive.

Yet here we precisely begin to see reason for doubt that any Sino-Soviet war is really in the offering. The Chinese retaliatory capability is already reasonably secure, such that several Soviet cities at least (Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Vladivostok, etc.) would suffer badly in any war which the USSR had escalated to the nuclear level. Even a conventional war would be costly enough to make it

difficult for the Chinese and Russians to rediscover some Marxist common ground.

It is at least as plausible therefore that what is going on is simply a war of nerves in which the Russians are trying to force Peking to adopt a low posture now, abandoning ideological polemics and criticisms of the USSR. Wars of nerves sometimes become real wars, of course, if either side lets the game get out of hand. An important part of the game for either side will involve marshalling prospects of outside support if the confrontation should get more severe or violent. One prospect for the 1970's is thus indeed that the United States will be drawn into lending background support to the Chinese position, in an effort to keep Moscow from taking its option of invading China too seriously, in an effort to bolster Peking in ways which keep the mutual recriminations within the Communist world flowing.

If war is thus possible, but still unlikely, between China and Russia, are there any other inferences to be drawn from this confrontation that might bear on our possibility of peace in general? Would a Sino-Russian war have to be nuclear, since both powers possess nuclear weapons? It is noteworthy that China and Russia are the only two nuclear weapons states that share a frontier, indeed one of the longest frontiers in the world. There has not yet ever been any war between two nuclear powers, only wars involving such states through satellites. Or might the war between China and Russia be kept non-nuclear, because the tradition

of not using atomic bombs in anger has really laid a grip on the world now, and precisely because each side's possession of the bomb should deter the other's use?

The Chinese statements on exploitation of nuclear weapons are the most specific and committal known to the world, that China "under no circumstances" will ever use such weapons unless another state has used them first. Such statements were released in 1965 when the hypothetical context might well have been an invasion by 500,000 American troops; they have been repeated since 1970 in the context of a million Russian troops along the border. Perhaps it stretches the credibility of all such statements to assume that Chinese bombs would really remain unused even if a Soviet army was entering the outskirts of Peking, or advancing into central China in a purely conventional war, but this is what the statement says. Any other of the nuclear powers would be presumed to escalate if Washington, or London, or Paris, or Moscow were "conventionally" threatened.

Is it conversely likely that the Russians would want to escalate to the nuclear level? Such escalation would, of course, be tempting if it could take the form of a grand preemptive strike eliminating all the Chinese nuclear forces before they could inflict any retaliatory damage on Russian cities or military forces. But this prospect hardly seems as feasible in 1973 as it might have in 1969 or 1965. In light of Chinese statements, and the natural

logic of retaliation, a Russian use of nuclear weapons would very probably bring some Chinese nuclear strikes in return. Could it be that Russian escalation would still be thought necessary or desirable, merely to make up for a Chinese superiority in numbers? While such speculation might bolster the Russian position during the bluffing of a war of nerves, it is difficult to see why this would be to the advantage of the Soviet side, given the enormous damage that would be produced. The Russians in agreeing to forego ABM protection in the SALT agreement certainly exposed their population more fully to Chinese nuclear attack; this might well be taken as a sign that war with China is really not all that likely, or at least that such a war would be kept to the conventional level.

Could the United States "stand idly by" if a nuclear war occurred between Russia and China? If the war were sure to happen, or were already under way, the United States might well try to stand as clear of it as possible, hoping that fallout does not become too much of a hazard through the northern hemisphere, hoping that no missiles land by mistake on targets outside the combatants, praying that neither elects to take nuclear revenge on the U.S. because Peking or Moscow have been destroyed. A very different U.S. attitude may show up, however, as long as such a war seems still a good distance off, with Washington putting some effort into seeing to it that this war remains unlikely, perhaps bolstering Peking if it needs bolstering, and vice versa.

I think this is far too weak a statement

If small wars threaten or happen along the Sino-Soviet border, the long-run impact on the peace of the world may yet be beneficial. First, this would signal once more, if anyone needed the signal, that the Sino-Soviet bloc was no longer a bloc, such that the "free world" had less to fear in the way of any coordinated military aggressions from the Marxist world. Second, and more important, the maintenance of a nuclear no-first-use policy in China and Russia, with China clearly explicating this policy, would tend to further the legitimacy of no-first-use all around the globe and, in a round-about way, would again make deterrence and nuclear war recede a little more from the public's imagination.

This all would assume, of course, that a war in North Asia was even as likely as 10 percent for the 1970's. Even as arms controllers, however, we may be anticipating wars for the sheer stimulation of thinking about them, or of thinking about how to prevent them. Harrison Salisbury can sell books by taking a pessimistic line on peace between the USSR and China; one might wonder whether many more of us in our writings do not succumb to the same temptation of being interestingly pessimistic. In predicting the likelihood of peace, or the likelihood of terminating arms races, or the likelihood of containing nuclear proliferation, few of our readers would really mind if we were pessimistic and turned out to be wrong. One could speculate further that thoughts of Sino-Soviet war may supply a certain rejuvenation for Cold War-oriented writers; the prospect of such a war might seem to

demonstrate that at least one of these powers could never be trusted, and possibly both. Does this not serve as a ready-made rationale for continued American preparedness and military strength? It would be left to particular writers whether they will want to whole-heartedly back one side, or find evil in both.

Yet, here as elsewhere, we might continually remind ourselves that a list of possibilities is not equivalent to a list of realities. When discussing the risk of a Russian attack, the Chinese may be playing the same game as Secretary Laird played a few years ago, exaggerating the likelihoods for the sake of brevity, and to marshal outside support. Someone trying to assess the real risks of war thus may need to discount a lot of this as propaganda, or at least as a beguilingly misleading shorthand. China might be able to hold its own militarily, if war came, inflicting unacceptable nuclear destruction on Soviet cities if the Russians had made it a nuclear war, inflicting unacceptable losses on the Russian Army by guerrilla tactics otherwise. Each of these responses involves great costs for China, but enough costs for the USSR so that war is not as likely as some Peking spokesmen now find it expedient to pretend.

China probably will be able to hold its own politically, with little more happening militarily than some occasional border incidents. This reflects the changed array of forces, with the U.S. and China becoming de facto partners here in deterring the Russians. Much more, it reflects the changed nature of military capabilities in the 1970's, and the limits on their use.

~~Much more, it reflects the changed nature of military capabilities in the 1970's, and the limits on their use.~~

Will Arms Control Also "Fade Away"?

If deterrence is ^{becoming} boring, because nuclear war is not really a problem, disarmament will also seem boring. Proposals and counter-proposals, within SALT or the ECSC or the CCD will draw even less public attention than before. This may make serious arms-control easier, or more difficult. It may also prove that serious arms-control is not so necessary, as the "commonsense" of the world is sometimes more relevant than we as specialists suppose.

Military questions and military threats might thus just "wither away" without any major disarmament agreements to punctuate the exact moment at which they disappeared. The presence of nuclear weapons may dialectically more and more mean the absence of any serious prospect for the use of such weapons. Nuclear umbrellas may stay folded, and tucked in corners, because the rain they are meant to shield against never even appears on the horizon. People from city to city may stop counting missiles. Perhaps they could have stopped counting six years ago as the relative ratios become meaningless, as the absolute residual after any plausible counter-force operations would always be enough to produce deterrence. Perhaps the publics of the world would have stopped counting now even if counting had remained relevant. Perhaps even a breakthrough in ASW coupled to another in MIRV and guidance technology

I agree with your point
from the military standpoint,
but what about the civilians?

will not again arouse as many people as Sputnik and the missile-gap and the H-bomb did..

The claim is not being seconded here that the visible numbers of missiles are only significant if they really can alter strategic calculations and war outcomes. If the great mass of the publics in various countries think some "shift in the strategic balance" is important, than a self-confirming importance may appear, whether or not we as professional strategists know better. In the early 1960's, the opinion leaders of Belgium and Malaya and the U.S. and the USSR thought that the U.S. had developed a meaningful superiority in missiles. If careful calculations showed that the USSR would still have been able to inflict unacceptable retaliation on the U.S. in any war, this did not settle the issue. What if the Russians now move to reverse the ratios and apparent imbalances of 1963, by accumulating a larger number of land-based and submarine-based missiles. Won't the Mayor of Brussels now be telling his cocktail-party companions that it is sad that the Russians have become superior at the strategic level, sad that the "finest hour" of 1963 has been turned around?

This is certainly possible, and it may well be what Soviet decision-makers were after when they appropriated resources for another round of missile production at the start of the 1970's. Yet it may never materialize, as the opinion-makers that matter rather lose count of (and lose interest in) the numbers of missiles.

If the general proposition of a boredom with deterrence and strategic war is correct, the Soviet leaders will feel disappointed and cheated with the political fruits of their investment in missiles, wondering why they could not buy what McNamara and Kennedy had bought in 1961. What Rumanians and Philipinos and Belgians and West Germans think about the strategic balance is very important; to some extent, this is what "Finlandization" is all about. Yet they may no longer think frightening thoughts about the balance.

As noted, boredom about strategic weaponry may explain some of the peculiar American reactions to Soviet deployments in or near Cuba; in 1962, the Democratic administration and the American public were indeed aroused, despite Secretary McNamara's original calm observation that a missile was a missile. Some of Kennedy's objections might have appeared simply on the fear that Castro would acquire an ability to fire missiles based in Cuba, even when Moscow would have not fired them. Such a form of de facto proliferation would have been difficult to tolerate, given the 1962 American image of Castro as one of the least rational and sensible of the Marxist rulers. Another part of the American anger stemmed from public feelings that a meaningful arms race was still on, a race that had begun with Sputnik and the "missile gap" fears of the late 1950's, which still would require that the Russians not claim any particular advantage by moving medium-range missiles into forward firing positions. Yet one can still wonder whether the Kennedy Administration would really have had any great public

concern on its hands if it had elected to shrug off the Russian deployments to Cuba; perhaps the public became aroused precisely because the administration put it into a position where it could not be anything else but aroused. If there was a deeper public sensitivity to strategic deployments here, moreover, some of it seems to have faded in the decade since.

In 1970, Russian probes with missile-carrying submarines to be docked in Cuba drew warnings from the Nixon administration, but produced relatively few echoes in the United States public. Some Congressional statements objected that such deployments were threatening to American cities, but the larger majority of the public had now apparently already digested the fact that every city in the U.S. is already many times threatened, or had lost interest in the fact, or had repressed the fact. Perhaps Americans may become irate at any Soviet move which reminds them of their vulnerability to mutual assured destruction, but the evidence for any genuine psychological problems of repression here is very scarce. If President Kennedy had not set a precedent of American resolve in 1962 it is questionable whether Nixon would have even felt forced to renew American oppositions to Soviet missiles near Cuba in 1970. By 1971 and 1972, moreover, American and world attention had been drawn to Nixon's striking initiatives with Communist China; even if Russian missiles were now to be placed into Cuban waters or territory, it was less likely now that anyone would question Nixon's performance vis-a-vis Moscow in the international arena.

becoming

The public is thus uninterested in deterrence, or in lacks of deterrence. It is similarly uninterested in comprehensive total disarmament, or in agreements to ban the first-use of nuclear weapons, or in anything else that we call strategic arms control. One wonders how many Americans, or even opinion-leading Americans, could identify what the initials SALT stand for; similarly, European excitement with the subject does not exist.

And what about nuclear proliferation? Given the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to persuade all the nations of the world to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), one might have expected that this strategic armaments question in particular would have captured more attention. Given that nation after nation is developing a de facto atomic-bomb production capability, by means of the plutonium that will flow out of electrical-power producing reactors, one would have expected a certain lust for such weapons in "nth" countries. As additional support for the boredom hypothesis, neither seems to be happening. With significant exceptions, most "nth" countries are not preparing to manufacture A-bombs and H-bombs at the first opportunity. In countries which are not signing or ratifying the NPT, moreover, the debate has not typically extracted any profound or intense sentiment from the public; rather such debates have been handled by small groups of men, often simply pursuing the career goals so familiar to the bureaucratic politics model.

This indifference to the straightforward "arms control" of non-proliferation has eased some problems and created some others. Part of the explanation for why Sweden signed and ratified the treaty is that the Swedish public has lost whatever interest in nuclear weapons it was expressing in 1959; to advocate bombs in Stockholm today would be to attempt to freshen up what had become a very stale issue. If a similar weariness with such options and questions has spread far enough, the NPT may work; indeed, one subtle impact of the treaty may have been to force electorates to confront the bomb question prematurely, hopefully in a way which would make the issue look stale and overworked in every election campaign of the future.

Yet a cost of this tedium is that it becomes difficult and close to impossible to alarm any particular national public or leaders about proliferation any distance away. Japanese may not lust after bombs, but also do not seem to worry about Indian bombs. Germans worry less than they might about proliferation to Australia, and vice versa. Nations which hold back their acceptance of the NPT do so because they want economic concessions, or political-prestige concessions, not typically ~~because they are bomb-minded~~ because they are bomb-minded. Yet such delays on signing or ratifying the NPT threaten the effectiveness of the treaty as a barrier where a barrier may in fact be needed, e.g. Israel or India. And if Israel or India were indeed to take strategic matters seriously, so seriously that they acquired atomic bombs, the proliferation question might become more interesting again all around the globe, interesting in a way which was rather unfortunate.

Is there thus a great deal of irresponsibility among the "nth" countries who hold back their acceptance of the NPT for relatively trivial and non-strategic reasons? Or is there greater irresponsibility among the nuclear powers who hardly are doing all they could to sell and support the treaty? Or could it be that "irresponsibility" is the wrong word, as the proliferation problem was never as serious as "arms controllers" would have had it? If deterrence and the strategic balance are to fade away, perhaps no one has all that much need to worry if India becomes one more state to have the bomb. Peace was not banished from the world on the day that Peking got its bomb; indeed Peking has said the most moderate things about such bombs that any possessor has ever said.

If peace is possible, with or without proliferation, are there any policy implications to all this, or are we merely to sit back contentedly to pursue a policy of "benign neglect"? Obviously, there is more to be done than merely to let good things happen. What is advocated here would rather be a policy of opportunism, a policy premised on an assumption that wars and armed confrontations may have been a necessary part of the sorting out of international relations after World War II and the period of decolonization, but that peace may be almost as necessary now.

Generalizations about the Cold War and about the inevitability or unacceptability of deterrence may thus pale when one has to try to compare an India-Pakistan war with a war within Vietnam, and then Vietnam with Biafra, and Biafra with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Generalizations about "left" versus "right," or "dove"

versus "hawk" may tell us less than a sensitivity to political situations which offer the equivalent of a military second-strike capability, as contrasted with situations which instead favor preemption and a continual recourse to the offensive. Europe and Southeast Asia have each done a turn of offering incentives to mutual attack and preemption, the first from 1946 to 1961, the second from 1950 to the present. There may be no requirement now that any other region incite the major powers similarly into grappling with each other.